Robin Stenwall
Senior lecturer
Some spanners in the works of grounding mechanisms removed
Author
Summary, in English
In this paper I address two concerns with Kelly Trogdon’s grounding mechanism view, i.e. the idea that metaphysical explanation can be modeled on causal-mechanical explanation. The first concern threatens to undermine the unity that grounding-mechanical explanations imposes on metaphysical explanation; and the second concern requires the grounding mechanic to put forth a formal condition on grounding-mechanical models. After having discussed both of these, I provide a solution to the first and argue that the second concern is unwarranted.
Department/s
- Theoretical Philosophy
Publishing year
2022
Language
English
Pages
293-310
Publication/Series
Axiomathes
Volume
32
Issue
S2
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Springer
Topic
- Philosophy
Keywords
- Metaphysical explanation
- Metaphysical grounding
- Mechanisms
- Causation
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 1122-1151