The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Robinbild

Robin Stenwall

Senior lecturer

Robinbild

Some spanners in the works of grounding mechanisms removed

Author

  • Robin Stenwall

Summary, in English

In this paper I address two concerns with Kelly Trogdon’s grounding mechanism view, i.e. the idea that metaphysical explanation can be modeled on causal-mechanical explanation. The first concern threatens to undermine the unity that grounding-mechanical explanations imposes on metaphysical explanation; and the second concern requires the grounding mechanic to put forth a formal condition on grounding-mechanical models. After having discussed both of these, I provide a solution to the first and argue that the second concern is unwarranted.

Department/s

  • Theoretical Philosophy

Publishing year

2022

Language

English

Pages

293-310

Publication/Series

Axiomathes

Volume

32

Issue

S2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Metaphysical explanation
  • Metaphysical grounding
  • Mechanisms
  • Causation

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1122-1151